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In his foundational work for person-
ality psychology, Allport (1927, 1937)
distinguished personality from character.
Personality was, on Allport’s account, a
descriptive concept referring to a psycho-
physical structure, whereas character was
personality evaluated in accordance with
moral norms. When he introduced the
paradigmatic “lexical” method of deriv-
ing personality trait terms from the dic-
tionary, he therefore sought to exclude
all trait terms with ostensive normative
content. This approach had a profound
effect upon the field, and researchers are
still today working on how to optimally
purge personality of normative content
(e.g., Bäckström et al., 2009; Pettersson
and Turkheimer, 2010). Its appropriate-
ness as a paradigm for the entire field of
personality psychology can, however, be
questioned (Kristjánsson, 2012; Nilsson,
2014). It is plausible that some personal-
ity characteristics particularly relevant to
psychic illness, human flourishing, and
moral behavior are intrinsically value-
laden (Cloninger et al., 1993; Cawley et al.,
2000; Peterson and Seligman, 2004).
I will focus on Cloninger’s approach
here, because he has, in addition to
introducing an influential model of
character, discussed the philosophical
foundations of the study of character and
well-being. For Cloninger (2004), char-
acter is not only value-laden; it refers
to uniquely human aspects of personal-
ity representing “what people make of
themselves intentionally” (p. 44), as con-
trasted with their animalistic temperament.
He wants the science of character and
well-being to transcend the dichotomy
between materialist reductionism and
Cartesian dualism, by taking the person’s
consciousness, agency, and processes of
self-growth seriously while integrating
this with knowledge about the human
physical and biological constitution.
Although I agree with this idea of hav-
ing a non-reductive psychological science,
I disagree with Cloninger about what it
entails. I will therefore review Cloninger’s
(2004) approach from a philosophical
perspective, in a critical and, hopefully,
constructive way. I will defend a notion
of non-reductive psychology based upon
contemporary academic philosophy and
argue that Cloninger’s approach is not
genuinely non-reductive. I will suggest
that a non-reductive psychological sci-
ence must take the person’s worldview
into account and argue that Cloninger’s
approach limits our understanding of
human psychology by not considering
the role of worldviews in the development
of character and well-being.
NON-REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM
Today, philosophers who seek to tran-
scend the dichotomy between reductive
materialism and Cartesian dualism gener-
ally adopt some version of non-reductive
materialism (Davidson, 1963, 1970; Fodor,
1974; Searle, 1983, 1992; Chalmers, 1996),
claiming that although all mental states
and events are causally realized in the
brain, there is not a particular type of brain
state corresponding to each type of men-
tal state. The reason for this is that we
identify and individuate mental states in
terms of a folk psychological language of
“attitudes,” “beliefs,” “desires,” “emotions,”
“goals,” etc., which is holistic, insofar as
it describes mental states as partly con-
stituted by their relations to each other
and their neurophysiological realization
and behavioral manifestation as therefore
dependent upon the entire network of
mental states. In other words, on non-
reductive materialism, no particular belief,
goal, desire, or other intentional state, let
alone a more complex folk psychologi-
cal concept such as “personality,” “charac-
ter,” or “well-being,” can even in principle
be isolated and reduced to neurophysi-
ology or behavior, and these irreducible
folk psychological concepts are crucial for
understanding human psychology.
A key implication of non-reductive
materialism is that human experiences
and actions are imbued with mean-
ing; to treat human beings as persons,
rather than mere mechanical systems or
animals, is to treat them as linguistic
beings, who construct reasons and act
upon them (Hacker, 2007), partly driven
by needs to create and sustain mean-
ings and to assuage fears and anxieties
fueled by their uniquely human awareness
of their existential condition (Nilsson,
2013). Although meaning-making is
today studied in such different fields as
the psychology of adaptation and well-
being (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Wong, 2012),
social psychology (Greenberg et al., 1986;
Heine et al., 2006), and neuropsychology
(Gazzaniga, 2005), researchers rarely take
into consideration the fact that meaning is
constructed within a worldview—the per-
son’s most basic beliefs, values, constructs,
and scripts for understanding, evaluating,
and acting upon reality, which ground
the network within which more specific
beliefs, goals, intentions, etc., are embed-
ded. A person necessarily lives through
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a worldview—s/he can only, for exam-
ple, act, morally or immorally, upon a
worldview, and experience well-being,
in its distinctly human form, through
a worldview. A non-reductive psycho-
logical science must therefore treat the
person’s worldview as an aspect of per-
sonality in its own right, not reducible
to behavioral or mental regularities (i.e.,
traits; Nilsson, 2014). Although personal-
ists (Allport, 1937; Stern, 1938; Mounier,
1952; Lamiell, 1987), narrative psychol-
ogists (Tomkins, 1965, 1979; McAdams,
1992, 2008), and construct psychologists
(Kelly, 1955; Little, 2005) have contributed
to such an endeavor, worldviews do not
receive the attention they deserve in con-
temporary psychology (Koltko-Rivera,
2004; Nilsson, 2013, 2014).
CLONINGER’S TRANSCENDENTALISM
Cloninger’s (2004) approach instead
merges elements of folk spirituality (cf.
Forman, 2004), Eastern thought, Hegelian
metaphysics, and quantum physics. He
suggests that a person’s consciousness can
be developed, through a process catalyzed
by meditation, reflection, and contem-
plation, toward increasing self-awareness,
wisdom, goodness, and well-being. In the
final, self-transcendent stage, the person
is freed of all “dualistic” thought of body,
mind, and spirit as separate and recog-
nizes that “the individual mind is like
a node in a universal Internet of con-
sciousness” (p. 36), thereby attaining
“coherence” of body, mind, and spirit,
unconditional well-being, potential access
to other minds, and “direct self-aware per-
ception of what is real and true without
misunderstanding as a result of precon-
ceptions, prejudices, fears, desires, and
conflicts” (p. 325). Cloninger (2004) also
draws parallels between self-transcendent
consciousness and quantum phenomena,
including the impossibility of precisely
determining the state and location of
quantum particles (“non-locality”) and the
Higgs field within which particles acquire
mass, and he claims, furthermore, that
the unpredictability (“non-causality”) of
quantum physical events is “another way
of talking about freedom” (p. 73) and
that “the thought of gifted people involves
intuitive leaps or quantum jumps, not
deductive algorithms” (p. 65; cf. Capra,
1975).
Cloninger (2004, p. 317) makes clear
that what he is proposing is not just a psy-
chological theory, but also a philosophy of
science:
The science of well-being is founded on
the understanding that there is an indis-
soluble unity to all that is or can be. The
universal unity of being is recognized
widely as an empirical fact, as well as
an essential organizing principle for any
adequate science [..] the universal unity
of being is the only viewpoint consistent
with any coherent and testable science.
This passage is puzzling insofar as it
describes the postulated unity of being
both as empirical fact, which implies that
it is open to empirical refutation, and as
essential organizing principle constitutive
of research in this area, which implies that
it is, in Quine’s (1953) terminology, close
to the center of the scientific field and
therefore not easily changed. Given that
Cloninger (2004) suggests that recognition
of the unity of being-thesis is ultimately
intuitive and not amenable to rational
argumentation or objective test, and that
its critics lack self-awareness, this thesis
is more properly treated as a presupposi-
tion and interpretive framework than as an
empirical fact (Popper, 1959).
But whether this is an appropriate, non-
reductive foundation for the study of per-
sons is questionable. On the non-reductive
account I am proposing, what is essen-
tial is that we take the person’s subjective
experiences and their meanings seriously,
in psychological terms, treating them as
real and irreducible; not that we assume
that special forms of experience convey
true insight into the nature of reality.
One problem with Cloninger’s approach
is precisely that it does not give meaning-
making the role that it deserves in per-
sonality measurement and explanation of
experience and action. Cloninger (2004)
offers parallels to quantum physics rather
than an account of reason-based explana-
tion (Davidson, 1963; Searle, 1983) and
Cloninger et al. (1993) measure char-
acter with traditional trait-type items
which focus on typical behaviors and
experiences, rather than worldview-type
items which ask persons about their most
basic beliefs, values, goals, and so on
(Nilsson, 2014). Cloninger’s use of quan-
tum physics to describe the mind is,
furthermore, whether interpreted as an
“analogy” (p. 65) or as an explanation
of “actual” processes underlying self-aware
consciousness (p. 328), difficult to rec-
oncile with non-reductive materialism.
Although it is conceivable that the hitherto
unidentified mechanisms through which
the brain causes consciousness, agency,
and certain qualitative feels operate at the
quantum level (Chalmers, 1996; Searle,
1997), the folk psychological concepts that
render our experiences and actions mean-
ingful and agentic are, because of their
logical holism, as irreducible to quantum
physics as to classical physics, and we have
little reason to assume that the causes
of conscious experiences are isomorphic
with their qualitative feels (Stenger, 1993;
cf. Brown et al., 2013). Similar to this,
Cloninger’s (p. 38) invocation of Allport’s
definition of personality as a “psycho-
physical system” is inconsistent with non-
reductive materialism, insofar as it is
understood as implying that personality
can be reduced to a neuro-physiological
causal system (Nilsson, 2013). Finally, the
Hegelian monist metaphysics Cloninger
(2004) draws upon is rejected today even
by Hegelians. For example, Pippin (1989,
p. 4)—one of several philosophers reinter-
preting Hegel in non-metaphysical terms
in order to rehabilitate his philosophy—
thinks that the “metaphysical monist or
speculative, contradiction-embracing logi-
cian [..] is not the historically influential
Hegel.”
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Cloninger et al. (1993) model divides
character into: (1) self-directedness, or
agency, which incorporates acting delib-
eratively on personal goals and val-
ues, taking responsibility for actions,
and developing resources for goal pur-
suit and self-acceptance, (2) cooperative-
ness, or communion, which incorporates
compassion, empathy, helpfulness, accep-
tance of others, and acting on moral
principles rather than self-interest, and
(3) self-transcendence, which incorporates
a sense of unity underlying the uni-
verse and connecting the self with the
world around it, intuitive apprehension
of relationships that cannot be explained
rationally or observed objectively, and
experiences of flow, absorption, and self-
forgetfulness. These aspects of character
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correspond, respectively, to the person’s
relation to the self, to others, and to
the universe. As such, they undoubtedly
refer to basic aspects of our intentional
engagement with the world. But the model
does not take different worldviews into
account. Self-transcendence, in particu-
lar, appears conflated with spiritual self-
transcendence—that is, self-transcendence
through spirituality. Self-transcendence, in
a more general sense, can be understood
as the pursuit of meaning and identity
through participation in, and selfless con-
tribution to, something larger than the
self, whether this is a divine or spiri-
tual reality, a community of persons or
sentient beings, or an ideological ideal
(Schwartz, 1992; MacDonald et al., 1998;
Koltko-Rivera, 2004). It requires only that
the person is connected to the outside
world through intentional directedness at,
and engagement with, that world; it does
not require an actual physical or spiritual
connection between the person and that
toward which s/he directs him-/herself.
More generally, I suggest that character
can be understood in terms of the inter-
action between the three proposed dimen-
sions and the person’s worldview, and
that researchers therefore need to inves-
tigate how different worldviews facilitate
and inhibit the development of character.
Because character is an intrinsically nor-
mative concept, what counts as character
is partly an empirical question—character
is what turns out to produce desirable
psychological, moral, and social conse-
quences. We might ask, for example, if,
and if so how, different worldviews can be
reconciled with ethical self-transcendence,
selfless love, genuine happiness, tolerance,
creativity, autonomy, and experiences of
wonder, beauty, and awe. It is, I sug-
gest, unlikely that there is one ultimate
path of character development suitable
for all persons. Cloninger’s (2004, p. 29)
own observation that “outstanding expo-
nents of positive philosophy have often
had limited success in helping their follow-
ers develop coherence” is true, I suggest,
partly because neither worldview nor the
development of character and well-being is
a one-size-fits-all. By considering the full
potential range of personalities emerging
from the diversity of human worldviews,
we can, I contend, better understand and
encourage the development of character
and well-being, thus potentially harness-
ing the full positive potentials of human-
ity for cultural and social progress (cf.
Cloninger, 2004, 2008, 2013).
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